The Role of the Kwantung Army in Japan’s relationships with China During 1920s and 1930s
Since Meiji Restoration, Japan walked on the path of self-strength and industrialization. After the surprising victories in the Sino-Japanese war in 1895 and Russo-Japanese War in 1905, Japan entered the 20th century as a world power. However, Japanese imperialism rapidly developed and led Japan into the destructive World War II. The Kwantung Army played a significant role that led Japan into the path of War. The Kwantung Army was an excellent example of “man on the spot.” It was remote from Tokyo, so it often acted independently from the Japanese government. The Kwantung Army officers had inherent disadvantages in the military career because these officers were China-hands and field officers who didn’t have strong patron-client connections. The successes of the unilateral actions brought to power, fame, and chances for promotions for these officers without paying for the expense of failure. Thus, these officers in Manchuria took advantage of the remoteness and influenced Japanese relationship with China through unilateral actions and gained power, fame and advancement opportunities without paying for the negative consequences. The Kwantung Army became the most important factor of the Sino-Japanese relationship during the 1920s because of these unilateral actions done by its officers.
The Case of the Kwantung Army
After the Sino-Japanese War and Russo-Japanese War, Japan gained significant benefits in Manchuria. To protected the railway and leased land, and prevent Russian revenge, Japan dispatched an army force into Manchuria. According to Professor Alvin D. Coox, Tokyo initially sent around one division into Manchuria. Since the beginning, this army unit operated beyond military duties and substantially involved in the governance of Manchuria. This dispatched force served as complementary of the newly established police force and actively suppressed “bandits” and maintained public order. By 1919, when the Manchuria Dispatched Army was renamed the Kwantung Army, it was the strongest fighting force in the Asian Continent. The Kwantung Army General also became one of the dominant individuals in Manchuria.
The Kwantung Army also intervened the Chinese civil war. After the collapse of the Qing Empire in 1912, China fell into turmoil. Powerful warlords fought each other to become the new ruler of China. The Nationalist party, led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, established a government at Guangdong Province. A weak, separated China served the interest of Japan. Therefore, Japanese government actively supported the pro-Japanese factions in China. The Kwantung Army actively supported various warlords to maximize its benefits. To protect Japanese investments and assets in Manchuria, the Kwantung cooperated with the warlord of Manchuria, Zhang Zuolin. The Kwantung Army not only armed Zhang’s troop with Japanese weapons but also provided staffs as top political and military advisors. In return for the support, Zhang granted special interests to Japanese cooperation in mining and factory operation protected Japanese properties in Manchuria. According to Professor Myers, the total revenue of the South Manchuria Railway increased significantly in 1917, when Zhang Zuolin became the ruler of Manchuria. From 1917 to 1928, the death of Zhang Zuolin, the total revenue of the SMR almost quadrupled (Myers P113).
Not everyone was satisfied with Zhang Zuolin’s rule in Manchuria. A young military officer under Zhang, Guo Songling, strongly opposed Zhang Zuolin’s policies. According to Zhang Xueliang’s Oral History, organized by Taiwanese historian Tang Degang and published in 2009, Guo was heavily influenced by the “progressive thoughts” promoted by the Nationalist government in Guangdong. Guo disagreed with Zhang’s policy to continue the Civil War, and strongly supported the negotiation process between the Beiyang government, which Zhang Zuolin was a leading figure in the administration, and the Nationalist government. Besides, Guo disliked the cooperation policy between Zhang and Japanese. Guo was also furious about Zhang’s support over Yang Tingyu, his biggest political enemy. Guo started to contact with the Soviet Union secretly. The Russians had long been resentful and worried about Japanese activities in Manchuria and wanted to eliminate Zhang Zuolin. Thus, Soviet Union promised to support Guo’s rebellion against Zhang and helped established contact between Nationalist and Guo. In November 1925, Guo rebelled against Zhang Zuolin.
The Kwantung Army faced a difficult decision. The Japanese were not satisfied with Zhang, but they feared that because of Guo’s connection with the Russians. The success of Guo Songling could introduce Soviet influence into Manchuria. After Guo’s success, he might even abolish Japanese privileges in Manchuria because of his nationalistic belief. According to Zhang Xueliang’s Oral History, the Kwantung Army chose to support Zhang Zuolin to preserved its economic privileges and political influence within Manchuria. During the Guo Songling rebellion, the Kwantung Army blocked Guo’s military force and helped Zhang to suppress him. In return for the favor, Zhang Zuolin allowed the Kwantung Army to move its headquarter from Port Arthur to Mukden, the capital of Zhang Zuolin’s Manchuria government. The support of Zhang during the Guo Songling rebellion was a decision made by Kwantung Army rather than Tokyo. During the 1920s, Japan readjusted policies toward China to non-interventionist policy. Tokyo viewed the Guo Songling Rebellion as a local problem of China that Japan should not involve in. When Guo’s Rebellion broke out, Prime Minister Tanaka said that it “does not matter for us Japanese at all whether Zhang Zuolin or Guo Songling wins. (Banno Junji P324)” However, for the Kwantung Army, Guo Songling’s Rebellion was a major issue. Guo’s rebellion directly threatened the influence and prestige of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria. In this case, the Kwantung Army prioritized own interests above the foreign policy of Japanese Empire, took advantage of its remoteness from Tokyo and acted secretly and independently to stop Guo Songling.
Except supporting Zhang Zuolin, the Kwantung Army also supported Feng Yuxiang and his Northeast Army against the anti-Japanese Zhili factions. According to Professor Coox, Doihara Kenji, the famous Kwantung Army intelligence officer, operated in the camp of Feng Yuxiang and cooperated with Feng’s military advisor Matsumuro Takayoshi. Through this channel, Feng received one million yen from the Kwantung Army that led to Feng’s final victory over Zhili warlords. By engineering the defeat of Zhili faction, without the knowledge of Tokyo, the Kwantung Army gained confidence in its ability to intervene Chinese domestic politics as it pleased (Coox, P402). Furthermore, the Kwantung Army also established connections with the Nationalist Government in the South China. However, the contact with the Nationalist government in Guangdong was a failure. The Nationalists, influenced by socialist ideology and Chinese Nationalism, distanced itself from Japan and cooperated with the Soviet Union. Kwantung Army secretly established these connections with both Feng and the Nationalist. The interaction between Kwantung and various Chinese warlords was the start of the Kwantung Army’s independent China policy.
The relation between Kwantung Army and Zhang Zuolin was not as smooth as the Japanese expected. Zhang Zuolin often disagreed with his Japanese advisors in different aspects. Zhang didn’t satisfy all demands from Japanese, excluded Japanese advisors from the decision-making process and reluctant to cooperate with Japanese in oppressing the anti-Japanese movements in Manchuria. In Professor Zhang Jinsong’s research paper Analysis of Huanggutun Incident from the Secret Letters of Komoto Daisaku, the Senior Staff of the Kwantung Army, Komoto Daisaku, wrote in his letter that planned to “eliminate Zhang Zuolin and support the pro-Japan leader of Manchuria.” He continued that this plan “received broad support by the Shishis in Manchuria.” Another Chinese scholar, Zhao Boyang, further proved the Japanese-Zhang Zuolin conflict in his paper Analysis of the Evidence of the Huanggutun Incident. Zhang Zuolin wrote in his personal letter that “the conflicts with Japanese caused misunderstandings and these misunderstanding have not been solved for years.” Both the Japanese side and Chinese side confirmed that disputes between Zhang and the Kwantung Army existed for an extended period. The conflict between Zhang and the Kwantung Army finally broke out during his campaign against the Nationalist’s North Expedition. In 1926, the Nationalist government at Guangdong, fought a serious of battles northward to unify China. In 1928, after defeating warlords in South and Central China, the Nationalist determined to complete the unification process by taking over North China and Manchuria. During the conflict with Zhang Zuolin, the Nationalists gained early victories. Facing the danger of a total defeat, Japanese tried to force Zhang retreated to Manchuria while he decided to stay in Beijing and fight until the last soldier. Zhang also rejected Japanese demands, including the disarmament of his military force and more special economic privileges in Manchuria. After the negotiation had failed, the Kwantung Army planned to eliminate Zhang Zuolin, create chaos and take over the entire Manchuria. June 4th, 1928, when Zhang Zuolin’s train arrived at Huanggutun, the Kwangtung Army assassinated Zhang through an explosion. After the assassination, the expected chaos didn’t happen. His son, Zhang Xueliang, entered Manchuria secretly and pacified the situation. Later, Zhang Xueliang negotiated with Jiang Jieshi and decided to join the Nationalist party.
Senior staff Komoto Daisuke planned the assassination with the assisted of several lower-ranking officers, such as the influential intelligence officer Doihara Kanji, who would have become one of the most influential figures in Kwantung Army after this incident. The high command of the Kwantung Army approved the plan of assassination; however, the Japanese government and Army General Staff in Tokyo were kept in blind. Prime Minister Tanaka was furious about the murder. He called the Kwantung Army officers “behave like children” who “have no idea what the parent has to go through (Coox P405).” The death of Zhang brought problems to Tokyo. During the 1920s, Japanese government strictly followed the Open-Door policy, improved cooperation and increased trade with China. Japanese cooperation started to establish businesses in China. However, in 1927, after Japan sent troops to Shandong, nationwide anti-Japan boycott broke out. According to historian Banno Junji, Japanese business in China, especially small businesses, suffered significantly during the boycott. In 1928, the boycott started to cease; the assassination of Zhang Zuolin could spark a new wave of boycott that would damage Japanese businesses in China deeply. The murder caused the final break up between Zhang’s military and Kwantung Army. Japan lost not only economic privileges in Manchuria, but also political prestige. After Zhang Xueliang had terminated cooperation with the Kwantung Army, he negotiated with the Jiang Jieshi, the leader of Nationalist Party, and decided to join the Nationalist Party. As Zhang joined the party, the Nationalist Party finally brought Manchuria under its control and unified the whole China. To deal with Manchuria issues, Japanese must deal with the Nationalist central government in Nanjing, rather than the local government in Manchuria; thus, Japanese’s influence over Manchuria declined significantly. Also, the assassination of Zhang violated the Open-Door policy and the Nine-Power Treaty signed in 1922; therefore, the Tokyo government faced significant opposition from western powers.
After the Huanggutun Incident and the failed attempt to occupy Manchuria, the Kwantung Army tried again in 3 years. September 18th, 1931, a small group of the Kwantung Army staffs blew up a small portion of South Manchuria Railway and blamed the Chinese military for conducting such event. The Kwantung Army seized this opportunity and assaulted Manchuria. This time, the Kwantung Army occupied Manchuria successfully. Two Kwantung Army staffs, Ishiwara Kanji and Itagaki Seishiro, who would have gained significant fame after this incident, planned this Mukden Incident and received permission from the Commander of the Kwantung Army without acknowledgment from Tokyo. A day after the Incident, both Army General Staff and the Cabinet ordered the Kwantung to “contain the situation in Manchuria.” During the September 25th League of Nations conference, the Japanese government declared that the Japanese military would retreat immediately to “solve the crisis through the peaceful and diplomatic way.” At the same time, the consul of Mukden negotiated with the Kwantung Army high officials, but the Kwantung Army rejected the proposal of retreat. Prime Minister Wakatsuki resigned because he was unable to solve the Manchuria crisis through peaceful means. In the Mukden Incident, the independent action of Kwantung Army not only shaped the foreign policy toward China but also influenced the cabinet politics of Tokyo and caused the resignation of a Prime Minister.
After the occupation of Manchuria, the Kwantung Army planned to establish a new puppet state in Manchuria. In 1932, the Kwantung Army officially established Manchukuo, with Puyi, the last Emperor of Qing Dynasty, as the ruler of the newly created state. Right after the establishment of Manchukuo, the representatives from Japan and Manchukuo signed the Japan-Manchukuo Protocol. According to this protocol, “Japan and Manchukuo pledge to cooperate in the maintenance of mutual peaceful existence by banding against common outside threats. (Article Two of the Protocol)” This vague clause was driven from the grand concept of Pan-Asianism and gave Kwantung Army a full range of power. Although Puyi became the Emperor, the Kwantung Army was the real ruler of Manchukuo. Puyi was forced to appoint Kwantung Army officers to the leading positions in Manchukuo. Yoshioka Yasunao, a senior officer in Kwantung Army, was Puyi’s Royal Advisor. Itagaki Seishiro was the political advisor to Manchukuo government. The reason for Puyi’s appointment of these Japanese officers into Manchukuo government was not clear. At one hand, the selection was based on the Protocol; to protect Manchukuo, the appointment of Japanese officers into Manchukuo government was necessary. On the contrary, according to Puyi At Khabarovsk Prison(Chinese：溥仪在伯力收容所) wrote by Puyi’s brother and close friends, Puyi understood the necessity to cooperate with the Kwantung Army from the first day of his reign. However, further research on this topic is necessary to answer this question fully. The Kwantung Army staffs held important positions within the Manchukuo government and became the dominant faction in the decision-making process. When Puyi confessed during the Tokyo War Trial, he said he was “just a puppet of Japanese.”
The Kwantung Army further expanded its power in Manchuria. The Kwantung Army Commander often hold concurrent posts of Ambassador to Manchukuo and the Kwantung Governor General. In 1933, Kwantung Army reorganized South Manchuria Railway and brought the company under its control. The Kwantung Army also initiated the aggressive immigration policies that brought more than 1 million Japanese settled in Manchuria. The power expansion was an important step for Kwantung Army’s independence. After the expansion, the Kwantung Army became the only dominant force in Manchuria. Kwantung Army, with the command of Manchukuo’s political, economic and military resource, became an independent entity that couldn’t be fettered by Tokyo Government; it executed sovereignty and with the support of military force just like an independent state.
Reason for Kwantung Army’s Independence
The lack of promotion opportunities contributed significantly to the Kwantung Army’s unilateral actions. The Kwantung Army officers gained power, fame, and merits that could help their advancement through victorious unilateral military assaults. When the Kwantung Army failed, the government in Tokyo would bear most of the cost, and Kwantung Army was only impacted indirectly. The cost-benefit analysis led to the unilateral military assaults practiced by Kwantung Army.
The ambitious Kwantung Army officers drove for the Independent actions. Just like Napoleon said about his French troop: “Every French soldier carries a marshal’s baton in his knapsack,” every officer of the Imperial Army desired to serve as a top commander in the Army General Staff. However, for Kwantung Army officers, the path toward the high command was more difficult. The military career tracks were biased against the Kwantung Army officers. The Kwantung Army officers were China-hands and field officers. However, China-hands and field officer faced disadvantages in their paths to the top posts in the Army. Generalist and West experts were more likely to promote in the military than the China-hands. According to Professor Kitaoka Shinichi, there weren’t any officers from China Section eventually promoted to the top positions of Army High Command; in contrast, nine out of the 18 Europe-America Section Chief became the top commanders of Army (The Japanese Informal Empire of China P342). At one hand, the army thought highly of Western studies and hailed young officers with Western experience. On another hand, the patron-client relations existed in the Military system influenced greatly on the army careers. The lack of patrons made the young China-hands difficult to enter the top commanding cycle. Also, these patron-client relationships were built within Army General Staff, the field officers in Kwantung Army didn’t have the chance to establish networks within the Army General Staff that could help their career.
To gain power, they need to act outside of the regular process. Acting independently became the most feasible way for quick promotion. Unilateral actions brought to power, glory, and chance to enter the Army top commands. After the Manchuria Incident in 1931, the Kwantung Army expanded significantly and became the ruler of the Manchuria. By controlling the military, politics, and economy of Manchukuo, the Kwantung Army became a self-sufficient entity. According to Professor Coox, after the Manchuria Incident, the Kwantung Army supported the East Mongolia Independence Movement and the “self-governance movement” in North China without the approval from Tokyo. The Kwantung Army formulated and executed its foreign policies independent from Tokyo. The unmatched power the Kwantung Army enjoyed led to the Manchuria Independence Policy, proposed by Ishiwara Kanji and supported by his colleagues. Ishiwara believed that Manchukuo and Japan must establish close alliance on the equal basis. According to this theory, Manchukuo and Japan enjoyed equal sovereignty and status quo. Kwantung Army, as the real ruler of Manchukuo, thus enjoyed de facto parity with the government in Tokyo. This policy clearly reflected the ambitious of Kwantung Army, as the dominator of an independent state, drafting and enforcing own policies within Manchuria. Because the Kwantung Army officers had disadvantages in their military career, becoming high officers in Manchukuo became their best choice. Fame also came with the unilateral actions. Kwantung Army officers became national heroes. Doihara Kanji’s influence increased significantly after the Mukden Incident and became the “Lawrence of Manchuria.” Itagaki Seishiro and Ishiwara Kanji also became the leading China-hands in the Imperial Army. The successes of military assaults also brought rare chances of advancement as well. Before the Mukden Incident, a young officer entered the Kwantung Army as a lower staff usually ended his career in the Kwantung Army. Because of the bias against the China-hands within the promotion system and the lack of the patron-client networks within the Army General Staff, he rarely had the chance to enter the Army Top Command in Tokyo. However, the Kwantung Army officers adjusted the disadvantages of remoteness and the lack of networking in Tokyo into advantages. Through successful unilateral action and expansion, the staffs in the Kwantung Army collected merits, achievements, and influences those officers in Tokyo couldn’t gain. The accomplishments from successful military campaigns certainly helped the advancement of the Kwantung Army officers. The planner of Mukden Incident, Itagaki Seishiro, and the founder of Manchukuo, Doihara Kenji, became Army General and served in the Supreme War Council. Because of the disadvantage of being China-hand and the lack of patrons in Tokyo, it is nearly impossible for the Kwantung Army officers to promote into the top command of the Army. The successes in military expansion certainly helped their military career by gaining accomplishments military officers in Tokyo didn’t have.
The cost-benefit analysis encouraged the Kwantung Army to practice brinksmanship. The Kwantung Army always enjoyed significant interests and privileges from unilateral actions without suffering negative consequences. When the Kwantung Army failed to take Manchuria in 1928, it barely received any negative impact. However, the Tokyo civilian government faced harsh criticisms and pressures from the United States and other Western powers because of the violation of the Open-Door Policy and the Nine-power treaties. Japan’s economic interest also impacted significantly in China because of the anti-Japanese boycotts. In 1931, when the Kwantung Army successfully occupied Manchuria, the Kwantung Army’s power expanded significantly. However, Tokyo civilian government faced pressured from the international community that resulted in the withdraw of the League of Nations and diplomatic isolation. Tokyo government’s plan of improving relations with Nationalist China was forced to abolish. Japanese businesses in China experienced even greater impact from the national boycott movement. The Kwantung Army officers were only loyal to own faction and put the interests of the Kwantung Army ahead of the more significant benefits of Japanese Empire. Thus, it is profitable for the Kwantung Army to risk the Tokyo government for the expansion of its interests and privileges. The Kwantung Army was encouraged to act independently based on this cost-benefit analysis especially when the profits they made from the successes of unilateral actions could directly lead to their personal gain and promotion.
Conclusion
When the Kwantung Army first officially created in 1919, it was a military unit with one division. During the next two decades, the Kwantung Army expanded significantly through brinkmanship without the consent from Tokyo civilian government and became the dominant military force in Asia and the chief actor in Japan’s relations with China. Throughout the expansion, the Kwantung Army became the real policymaker of Manchukuo. The Kwantung Army emerged big and self-sufficient enough to exercise its will. The unilateral actions were the reflection of the opportunistic views existed within the Kwantung Army. According to Professor Coox, the Kwantung Army officers often saw themselves as the best type of empire builders, and Manchuria was the perfect testing ground for their grand ideals of Pan-Asianism. In the other hand, unilateral actions became a quick route to power and glory for the opportunists, especially for those China-hand field officers in the Kwantung Army who lacked ways to enter the high command. The successes in the Kwantung Army in the Manchuria Incident set a precedent for military independence and inspired other field officers. For example, the sponsor of the China Incident once told Ishiwara Kanji, who strongly opposed a total war against China, that “I was only imitating Ishiwara’s Manchuria Incident.” As the primary shaper of Japan’s China Policy, the Kwantung Army’s unilateral actions pushed Japan into the path to World War II and self-destruction.
Citation
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